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We hypothesize that decisions to constrain government revenue may constitute an
attractive strategy, especially to right-wing governments, when pursuing a preference
for welfare state retrenchment. Whereas programmatic retrenchment in social policy
programs imposes concentrated losses in return for diffuse gains, the distributive profile
of systemic retrenchment via tax cuts might entail concentrated benefits for specified
groups financed by diffuse losses for larger groups in a distant future. Consequently,
the electorate may accept or even desire tax cuts and associated initiatives to curb
government income relative to retrenchment measures of services and benefits. Our
empirical analysis supports such theoretical propositions. In an extensive comparative
analysis of all tax laws adopted by four Danish governments, we find clear partisan
differences. In an in-depth study of the tax policy of the latest right-wing government,
we moreover empirically support the causality of the argument as the government did
in fact try to curb specific taxes in order to constrain the spending side of the welfare
state in an indirect manner.
Keywords: tax policy; retrenchment; policy making; welfare state; partisanship
Introduction
Political conflicts about taxation capture the essential question of how to strike
the balance between the state and the market. This, in turn, helped catapult
welfare state retrenchment onto the political agenda in the early 1980s, and a
decade later Pierson (1994: 15) explained theoretically how political decisions to
curb government income could be seen as a strategy of systemic retrenchment.
Nevertheless, the political economy literature has not explicitly explored whether
and to which extent governments actually do that (cf. Steinmo, 1993, 2002;
Swank, 2006; Cusack and Beramendi, 2006; Beramendi and Rueda, 2007). Students
of welfare retrenchment, on the other hand, have predominantly focused on
the spending side of the welfare state and generally neglected the revenue side.
* E-mail: cel@sam.sdu.dk
1
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773912000252
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Library, on 17 Jan 2017 at 09:43:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
This article aims to bridge these two research traditions by analyzing tax policy
strategies from a retrenchment perspective.
We argue that governments with political desires for welfare state retrenchment
and the ambition to preserve their chances of re-election have incentives to
pursue systemic retrenchment by tax policy decisions rather than programmatic
retrenchment in social policy (Pierson, 1994: 13). While social policy cutbacks
impose concentrated losses in return for diffuse and uncertain benefits, tax reliefs
and associated constraints to government revenue might deliver concentrated and
immediate gains in return for diffuse and long-term losses. For this reason, tax
reliefs should be more popular than cutbacks in welfare services and benefits.
Further, we argue that systemic retrenchment by means of tax reliefs is
associated with stronger partisan effects than recent studies of programmatic
retrenchment in social programs have been able to find (Pierson, 1996; Huber
and Stephens, 2001; Kwon and Pontusson, 2010). Political economists find that
political decisions on tax policy are associated with partisan effects (cf. Cusack
and Beramendi, 2006; Swank, 2006). Since systemic welfare state retrenchment
via revenue constriction can be designed in ways that make it less unpopular
than cuts in benefits, right-wing governments with a preference for less taxation
and a smaller – or at least not growing – public sector should be eager to pursue
such a strategy.
To test our theoretical propositions we follow a two-tracked strategy. First, we
conduct a comparative quantitative analysis of four Danish governments’ policy
intentions in tax policy, healthcare policy, and labor market policy in the period
1975–2008. We define policy intentions as legislative measures deliberately
undertaken in order to push policy developments of the welfare state in a certain
direction, that is, expansion or retrenchment. Second, we engage in an intensive
qualitative study of the tax policy strategies pursued by the right-wing govern-
ment in the period 2001–08. This approach provides an overview of general
patterns of systemic vs. programmatic retrenchment for governments of different
ideological orientation during an extended period of time, and it enables us
to investigate the causality of our core argument by evaluating the degree to
which tax reform was driven by government aspirations to shrink the welfare
state. This is altogether believed to produce a convincing political analysis of the
issue at hand (cf. Hacker and Pierson, 2010).
The article is structured in the following way. First, we further elaborate on
the theoretical distinction between programmatic and systemic retrenchment
and its implications for political strategies. Next, we discuss the political opportu-
nities inherited in systemic retrenchment and develop a range of hypotheses,
which capture our overall arguments. In the third section, we describe the
design of the empirical study in greater detail. This is followed by two empirical
sections in which we present the results of the quantitative and qualitative
studies, respectively. In the final section we evaluate our findings and discuss
their implications.
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The political difficulties of programmatic retrenchment
Contemporary research on welfare state retrenchment is strongly dominated by
the idea of the new politics of the welfare state (Pierson, 1994, 1996, 2001b).
According to this theoretical perspective, decisions to roll back social protection
are unpopular and associated with the electoral punishment of reform govern-
ments, which find themselves caught in a trade-off between the goals of policy and
votes (Vis, 2010). The retrenchment of social policy imposes ‘immediate pain on
specific groups, usually in return for diffuse, long-term, and uncertain benefits’
(Pierson, 1996: 144; Klitgaard, 2008: 482). The premise of the new politics
perspective is that institutional feedback from social programs furnish the welfare
state with political support from organized welfare clienteles whose political
behavior is determined by program dependency (Pierson, 1994). Since organized
interests attached to the welfare program in question mobilize voters against
retrenchment independent of the color of government, partisanship has become
largely irrelevant for the development of the modern welfare state (Huber and
Stephens, 2001: 221).
Even though the conclusion about the declining relevance of partisanship in
welfare retrenchment has recently been questioned (Allan and Scruggs, 2004;
Klitgaard and Elmelund-Præstekær, 2012), it is a well-motivated assumption that
partisan effects disappear from programmatic retrenchment cutting back on welfare
spending or reshaping programs in a direct manner (cf. Pierson, 1994). In the
period of permanent austerity, all governments confront similar challenges such as
demographic changes, budgetary constraints, new household structures, and social
risks to which the welfare state should adapt (Pierson, 2001a; Ha¨usermann, 2010).
Reshaping social policy programs and the enactment of spending cuts are logical
responses to such challenges as they usually have direct and immediate social and
economic effects. However, programmatic retrenchment accentuates the trade-off
between the goals of policy and votes. Hence, the combination of strong push
factors for programmatic retrenchment on the one hand, and possible electoral
repercussions on the other reduces governments’ room for maneuver (Huber and
Stephens, 2001; Kwon and Pontusson, 2010). Left-leaning governments are econo-
mically constrained from pursuing further expansions, while governments of the
right are politically constrained from pursuing radical retrenchment.
However, welfare state retrenchment may also occur as systemic retrenchment by
facilitating broader changes in the political economy. That is, an indirect measure of
retrenchment. This political option was theoretically discussed by Pierson almost
20 years ago and he pointed to decisions to constrain government revenue in order
to limit the amount of money that can be allocated to public programs as a key
strategy of systemic retrenchment. The logic of such a strategy is quite simple;
where there is no money there can be no programs (Pierson, 1994: 15). Compared
with studies of programmatic retrenchment, systemic retrenchment is discussed
and analyzed in the literature in only a rudimentary fashion. In the next section,
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we explain how governments can turn welfare state retrenchment into a less unpopular
political exercise by manipulating the revenue side, and why such a strategy is likely to
be associated with stronger partisan effects than cutbacks on the spending side.
The political opportunities of systemic retrenchment
The theoretical proposition advanced here is that the distributive profile of welfare
retrenchment can be changed if retrenchment is pursued by reducing taxes or the
state’s capacity to generate income. Changes in tax policy may of course occur for
other reasons (Romer and Romer, 2009), which have to be considered when studying
tax cuts in the perspective of systemic retrenchment. Political economists have
often seen national tax policy regimes as especially exposed to economic inter-
nationalization. Fluid capital, new patterns of investment, and mobile high-income
earners force policymakers to adapt national tax policy. Hence, tax reform is believed
to be driven by structural changes in the international economic environment, and
governments believed to have incentives to reduce taxes on capital, investments, and
mobile high-income earners (Steinmo, 2002; Swank and Steinmo, 2002; Swank,
2006). However, tax reform might also be driven by other forces; in particular, we
argue that tax policy can play an important role when governments pursue welfare
state retrenchment. To the extent that retrenchment strategies rather than globali-
zation are the impetus to tax reform, we expect reforms to be differently designed, as
we discuss further below.
Not all tax cuts automatically transmit into welfare cuts. But policy change at the
revenue side that modifies governments’ capability to create income can facilitate
creeping or hidden retrenchment that constrains future governments from
making new spending decisions. This is a type of systemic retrenchment that alters
the rules of the game and modifies the welfare state in the long run (Pierson,
1994: 15). Political efforts to constrain state revenue should be a more popular
retrenchment strategy than cutbacks on the spending side. The popularity of both
welfare state expansion and retrenchment seems in fact to hinge on whether taxes
are included in the calculus of costs and benefits. Even if welfare state expansion is
usually seen as a popular political measure, historically it did not occur in processes
from which decision makers easily could claim credit. Expansionary reforms
required either increasing tax revenues or public debt issuing, and political debates
in the expansion period often came to focus on trade-offs between increasing
taxes and continued expansions of the welfare state. In such debates, a negativity
bias comparable to the one characterizing contemporary retrenchment debates
was enforced because voters were asked to make clearly defined economic sacri-
fices in return for diffuse, long-term, and uncertain welfare benefits (Korpi and
Palme, 2003: 430).
Contemporary students of welfare state retrenchment should bear in mind that
welfare state architects too used blame avoidance techniques to avoid electoral
repercussions for expansionary initiatives such as the invention of added value
4 M I C H A E L B . K L I T G A A R D , C H R I S T I A N E L M E L U N D - P R Æ S T E K Æ R
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773912000252
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Library, on 17 Jan 2017 at 09:43:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
tax, levy dues, and income taxes paid directly by the employer. Such initiatives
obfuscated the real costs of expanding welfare programs (Buchanan and Wagner,
1977; Cameron, 1978). Parallel to this, the student of welfare state retrenchment
might benefit from recognition of the relative popularity of today’s tax reliefs.
Hence, including tax policy in the calculus of losses and benefits of welfare
state expansion entails a move from the upper right to the lower left quadrant in
Table 1. Likewise, welfare state retrenchment makes the opposite shift from the
lower left to the upper right quadrant when tax policy is taken into account.
If welfare retrenchment is pursued by a strategy of putting money back into the
taxpayers’ pocketbooks, it becomes a process of delivering concentrated benefits
in the form of immediate tax reliefs, paid for by diffuse, long-term, and uncertain
welfare losses that are detached from the initial retrenchment decision that
occurred at the income side. When taxes are reduced, it is directly reflected in
higher disposable income at the individual level. The taxpayer might increase
private consumption, pay off debt, or save money. For this reason, the strategy of
lowering taxes might be an especially feasible political strategy in the group
of encompassing European welfare states relying on direct taxation of incomes
(cf. Cusack and Beramendi, 2006). If governments pursue systemic retrenchment
by tax policy, we should observe that they cut back on direct income taxation of
wage earners in the lower and median income brackets. Such alterations of the tax
regime are not particularly market conforming or designed to increase inter-
national competitiveness, but they are visible to the taxpayers. Moreover, tax
reliefs in the lower and median income brackets appeal to large segments of the
electorate including the median voter.
How does the inclusion of taxation affect government strategy in welfare state
policy-making? Governments should be aware that tax cuts are no wonder drug
to reduce the trade-off between the goals of policy and votes. Survey studies have
documented that voters actually prefer to maintain levels of social protection over
cutting taxes (Andersen, 2003), which indicates that tax cuts are not per se
popular measures. However, other survey studies demonstrate that public support
Table 1. The distributive profile of welfare state expansion and retrenchment
Losses
Benefits Concentrated Diffuse
Concentrated Welfare state expansion (benefits)
Welfare state retrenchment
(benefits and taxes)
Diffuse Welfare state expansion
(benefits and taxes)
Welfare state retrenchment
(benefits)
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for welfare state expansion is inconsistently associated with attitudes on tax
policy (Mouritzen and Winter, 2001). Empirical evidence suggests that voters
suffer from fiscal illusions and basically want something for nothing (Citrin,
1979). In sum, we argue that even if a strategy of containing welfare growth in the
future based on cutting taxes has its limits, it provides governments with an
opportunity to frame an initially unpopular enterprise of retrenchment as some-
thing more popular – the act of delivering concrete benefits in the form of money
in the pocketbook.
The globalization thesis of tax reform holds that governments – regardless of
ideology and partisan composition – are forced to promote market-oriented
tax policies (Swank, 2006). However, we expect significant partisan differences in
governments’ preferences for systemic retrenchment via tax policy. Systemic
retrenchment is an indirect strategy that blurs the causal relationship between
political decisions – that is, tax cuts – and associated long-term spending cuts.
Because of the relative popularity of tax reliefs, the trade-off between policy and
votes should be reduced, which is why governments have the possibility to pursue
ideological preferences. Governments at different ends of the left–right scale are
supposed to promote the interests of different groups of voters. Social Democratic
and other left-leaning governments are supposed to promote the interests of groups in
lower income brackets, whereas right-leaning governments are believed to promote
the interests of upscale groups. Following the argument by Cusack and Beramendi
(2006: 53) ‘ypromoting the interests of labor is understood as taxing and spending
more, whereas advancing the interests of upscale groups is seen as taxing and
spending less’. Likewise, Swank (2006: 857) argues that recent decades of electoral
success of right-of-center parties facilitated market-conforming tax reforms.
Furthermore, right-wing governments might find systemic retrenchment especially
attractive. Not only is such a strategy perfectly consistent with their general
preference of less taxing and government spending, it would also reduce the capacity
of left-wing successors to pursue expansionary policies in the future (Persson and
Svensson, 1989). Left-wing governments are, by contrast, expected to be more
protective toward the income-generating capacities of the state – not only to cater to
the immediate interests of their core electoral constituency in the lower income
brackets but also to constrain the political maneuvering room for right-wing
successors. Although voters are satisfied with the initial level of the public services,
they adjust preferences and expectations relative to current levels.
Design of the empirical study
We adopt a comparative design to empirically test the theoretical propositions,
and focus on Danish tax policy in the period 1975–2008. For our purpose,
Denmark constitutes an appropriate case. Not only are Danish taxes among the
highest in the world, the public revenue primarily comes from direct income
taxation, while the welfare regime is characterized as universal. Hence, institutional
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features of both the revenue and benefit side of the welfare state leave large groups of
the electorate with incentives to support lower taxes and continued development of
the welfare state. If right-wing governments generally have strategic incentives to
pursue systemic retrenchment via cuts in the direct taxation of income, Denmark
should be a country where such strategies are most likely to be pursued. Moreover,
institutional characteristics of its political system such as a low number of veto points
and a strongly proportional electoral system are supposed to yield relatively strong
partisan effects (Cusack and Beramendi, 2006: 54–55). In sum, if the proposed
mechanism cannot be observed in Denmark, it is unlikely to be observed anywhere.
To test the argument that systemic retrenchment via tax policy is governed
by a different logic than programmatic retrenchment of welfare benefits we
compare tax policy to public health care and labor market policy. Public
healthcare policies are designed to absorb social risks that are ‘democratically’
distributed across social strata, meaning that everybody faces equal risk of illness
or injury (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 41). For this reason, healthcare provision is
universally supported among all segments of the voters, which is why govern-
ments – regardless of partisan composition – are especially hesitant to pursue
retrenchment in healthcare policy, as well as they should promote the interests of
the median voter rather than core constituencies in this area (Jensen, 2012).
Labor market policy should be different from tax policy in one respect but
similar in another. Retrenchment of labor market-related programs implies con-
traction of welfare benefits and is, consequently, expected to be pursued with a
lower intensity than tax cuts. However, since labor market programs protect
against class-risks, that is, unequally distributed social risks that especially affect
groups in the lower income brackets, such programs are unequally demanded by
different groups of voters (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 41). The primary beneficiaries
of labor market programs comprise the core constituency of left-of-center parties,
and left-wing governments should consequently be more reluctant than right-wing
governments to pursue retrenchment in labor market policy. In short, we expect to
observe a partisan pattern in the retrenchment of labor market policy comparable
to that in tax policy (Elmelund-Præstekær and Klitgaard, 2012; Jensen, 2012).
Table 2 summarizes the hypotheses that are tested in the empirical study.
Table 2. Hypotheses
H1 Governments that include right-of-center parties pursue policy intentions of tax cuts with
a stronger intensity than governments that include left-of-center parties
H2 Policy intentions of tax cuts are pursued by reliefs in direct income taxation for groups
with low and median wages
H3a In contrast to tax policy, no partisan effects can be detected in healthcare policy
H3b In congruence with tax policy, governments that include right-of-center parties pursue
labor market policy retrenchment with a stronger intensity than governments that
include left-of-center parties
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Hypotheses H1, H3a, and H3b are tested in the first part of the analysis where we
study the policy intentions of four governments in the three policy areas. Between
1975 and 2008 we find ample variation in the ideological composition of Danish
governments (see Table 3), and if we detect a partisan effect as predicted (H1), the
systemic retrenchment thesis is backed up by at least some empirical evidence.
To investigate such intentions we analyze legislative data, namely all individual
laws adopted in the three areas by the four governments (Keeler, 1993; Klitgaard
and Elmelund-Præstekær, 2012). The choice of legislative data is atypical, since
most students of welfare state retrenchment resort to different kinds of output
data (Huber and Stephens, 2001; Korpi and Palme, 2003; Allan and Scruggs,
2004). However, the nature of our study renders output data unsuitable because
the output of tax policy (i.e. government revenue) is incomparable with the
traditional output indicators of labor market and healthcare policy (e.g. govern-
ment outlays or length of waiting lists, levels of unemployment, or durability
Table 3. Danish Governments and supporting parties 1975–2008
Period Government Parties in government Parliamentary base of support
1975–82* Left Social Democrats Socialist Peoples’ Party and Social
Liberals
1982–90** Center-right Conservatives, Liberals, Center
Democrats, and Christian
Democrats (1982–88)
Social Liberals and Progress Party
Conservatives, Liberals, and
Social Liberals (1988–90)
Center Democrats, Christian
Democrats, and Progress Party
1993–2001 Center-left Social Democrats, Social
Liberals, Center Democrats,
and Christian Democrats
(only 1993–94)
Majority government
Social Democrats, Social
Liberals, and Center
Democrats (only 1994–96)
Socialist Peoples’ Party and Red-
Green Alliance
Social Democrats and Social
Liberals (1996–2001)
Socialist Peoples’ Party, Red-Green
Alliance, and Center Democrats
(until 1998)
2001–08 Right Liberals and Conservatives Danish Peoples’ Party, Christian
Democrats (until 2005)
Notes: *For a short period in 1978–79, Denmark was governed by a coalition of the
Social Democrats and the Liberals. Due to the exceptional status of this government, we
exclude it from the analysis. **Between December 1990 and January 1993, Denmark had
a right-wing government consisting of the Conservatives and the Liberals. Since it enjoyed
parliamentary support from the center parties, while the right-wing government of
2001–08 primarily was supported by the right-of-center, we exclude this government from
the analysis to be able to compare four distinct types of governments.
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of unemployment benefits). In practice, we measure policy intentions by coding
the official comments of adopted laws. We provide more details on the coding
procedure in the empirical section and in the Appendix.
We analyze the intended direction of the adopted legislation and not the degree
to which it affects the welfare state for two reasons. First, our prime interest is
whether governments basically want to increase or reduce the welfare state rather
than the degree to which they succeed in doing so. Second, even though some laws
expand or retrench more than others, it is virtually impossible to systematically
graduate the severity of adopted laws. Estimated budgetary consequences are
sometimes provided in the legislative material, but certainly not always. Here a
problem may arise from the fact that the entire income side is compared with only
two policy fields at the spending side. To adjust for the difference in the number of
laws adopted in the different policy fields, we standardize the measures.
Comparing Danish governments since 1975 also enables us to control for the
possible influence of an alternative explanatory variable that cannot be kept con-
stant during the period under research, namely the economy. As it appears from
Figure 1, the first two governments operated under much more dire economic straits
than the last two did. The left-wing government (1975–82) and the center-right
government (1982–93) faced rather equal economic challenges, whereas general
economic conditions improved significantly during the incumbency of the center-
left (1993–2001) and the right-wing (2001–08) governments. If we are able to
demonstrate consistent trends of similarity between governments of the same
ideological conviction and consistent trends of dissimilarity between governments
of different partisan composition, we have a strong indication that partisanship matters.
At least such patterns suggest that partisan effects are stronger than possible
effects of the general economic climate.
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Figure 1 Key economic indicators, 1974–2008. Vertical lines indicate change of government.
GDP5gross domestic product. Source: Statistics Denmark and own calculations.
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On the basis of a quantitative analysis of policy intentions, we cannot evaluate
the causality of the argument and say much about the drivers in tax policy reform.
To identify the possible causal links between policy intentions and government
strategy, we supplement with an in-depth analysis of the most recent right-wing
government’s tax policy strategies in the period 2001–08. The qualitative analysis
allows us to explore the ideas and strategic rationale behind adopted laws and
reforms in detail; did the government develop a tax policy strategy specifically
with the goal to achieve systemic welfare state retrenchment? Or did it merely
react to a changing global economy? Did the government design tax reforms to
affect the lower and median income groups, and is it possible to connect such
reforms to the electoral strategies of the government? To answer these questions
we rely on interviews with key governmental actors as well as government
programs and policy papers about taxes and tax reforms adopted by this parti-
cular government. We interviewed two former ministers, two high-ranking party
officials, and a civil servant in The Danish Ministry of Taxation. All interviews
were performed and recorded to electronic files in May and June 2012.
We focus on the most recent right-wing government for two reasons. First, since
interviews are invaluable data sources for this type of analysis, we found it better
to study a recent government. Second, this government enjoyed a stable right-
wing majority during its period of incumbency, which gave it the political strength
to formulate and pursue its own policy agenda independent of the opposition to
the left as well as the traditional pivotal Danish center party.
General patterns of systemic and programmatic retrenchment in Denmark,
1975–2008
In the period 1975–2008, a total of 1387 laws were adopted in tax, health care,
and labor market policy. Out of this total, 535 were intended to retrench the
welfare state, whereas the remaining 852 were initiatives to expand it.
Adopted laws were coded as retrenchments if they intended to reduce the extent
and/or quality of the welfare program, the financial viability, and/or political and
administrative capacity to pursue expansion in the future. On the benefit side,
retrenchment most often materialized as reductions in welfare state generosity,
while retrenchments in tax policy materialized as initiatives to curb government
revenues. Retrenchment may, furthermore, come across as changes to the insti-
tutional context of tax, health care, and labor market policies – examples of this
kind of retrenchment are amputation of the role played by interest organizations
(e.g. in the implementation phase) that generally support the welfare state, and
alteration of the balance between public and private providers to the benefit of the
latter (only applicable on the benefit side).
Laws were coded as expansionary if the government intended to increase the
extent and/or quality of the program, the financial viability, and/or political and
administrative capacity to pursue expansion in the future. On the benefit side, this
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is the case when welfare programs are made more generous, and on the revenue
side it is the case when a law increases the total revenue. Again, laws could be less
direct but fundamentally alter the institutional context. In rare instances, laws
provided no information about political intentions and such laws were excluded
from the analysis (see the methodology appendix for coding examples and tests of
inter-coder reliability).
As it appears from the totals in Table 4, the relatively high level of retrenchment is
mainly due to tax policy where almost half of all laws were meant to retrench the
welfare state. In the contrasting policy areas, the pattern is significantly different
(ANOVA, 0.05-level) as only 21% and 27% of the laws on health care and the labor
market pursued retrenchment. These empirical observations are consistent with the
core of the theoretical argument that systemic change based on delimiting tax revenue
is more popular than programmatic retrenchment on the benefit side. Indeed, the
expected difference between imposing concentrated losses in return for diffuse gains
and imposing concentrated benefits in return for diffuse benefits is significant.
Breaking the data on individual governments down, we find a similar empirical
pattern. Retrenchment is consistently and across different governments relatively
more often pursued in the mode of tax cuts than in cutbacks on the benefit side.
The differences between tax policy and the contrasting areas are only statistically
insignificant in two instances, namely between healthcare policy and tax policy
for the pure left-wing government, and between labor market policy and tax
policy for the center-right government (ANOVA, 0.05-level).
Focusing on tax policy specifically, a partisan bias is evident. Consistent with H1
we find that right-wing governments pursue tax cuts significantly more often – again
in relative terms – than left-wing governments. At least in tax policy, right-wing
governments seem to cater to the interests of upscale social groups, as 55% of all
laws adopted during right-wing incumbency in tax policy were meant to cut taxes.
The corresponding figure for left-wing governments is significantly lower, namely
42% (t523.67, P,0.001, two-tailed). Furthermore, we observe an increasing
tendency to pursue tax cuts as we move from the left to the right; the difference
between the pure left-wing government and the pure right-wing government
Table 4. Welfare state retrenchment in tax, labor market, and healthcare policy
1975–2008, percentages (absolute numbers)
Left-wing
average Left Center-left Center-right Right
Right-wing
average Total
Taxation 42 (212) 40 (63) 43 (149) 45 (81) 65 (109) 55 (190) 47 (402)
Labor market 23 (44) 18 (9) 25 (35) 30 (14) 32 (36) 31 (50) 27 (94)
Health care 19 (19) 25 (4) 18 (15) 19 (4) 26 (16) 24 (20) 21 (39)
Note: Absolute number of retrenchments is reported in parentheses. The average values on
specific issues and the average difference between left- and right-wing governments are weighted
to account for different numbers within different areas and under different governments.
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is 25% points (significance, ANOVA, P,0.01). In between the two ideologically
most distant governments, the two center-based coalitions do not differ much.
Nor do these center governments differ much from the pure left-wing government.
We conclude that the partisan bias in the tendency to pursue tax cuts is mainly due to
the pure right-wing government’s strong tendency to do so. This indicates that exactly
this government pursues welfare state retrenchment by imposing concentrated
benefits in return for diffuse losses.
According to our theoretical argument we should find a markedly different
pattern in programmatic retrenchment at the spending side and consistent with
H2a we find no partisan effect on welfare state retrenchment in healthcare policy.
The pure left- and the pure right-wing governments retrench equally little in
relative terms (25% and 26%, respectively). Center-based governments retrench
even more rarely (18–19%), but none of these differences are statistically signi-
ficant. Indeed, it seems that all types of governments are prone to cater the
demands of the median voter in this extremely popular policy area.
By contrast, and as expected, we find signs of a partisan bias in the proportions
of retrenchment vs. expansion when turning to labor market policy. Within
this policy field left-leaning governments seem eager to protect the interests of
core constituencies in the lower income brackets who face the greatest risk
of unemployment. As in tax policy we find an increasing tendency to enact
retrenchment when we move from the left toward the right, but the pattern is not
as pronounced as in tax policy. The most ideologically extreme governments only
differ by 14% points. The difference is, nonetheless, statistically significant
(ANOVA, 0.1-level) and the empirical analysis thus supports H2b.
Finally, partisan effects appear to be stronger than effects of the macroeconomic
context. Relatively large differences are found between the first two governments
(left and the center-right) and between the last two governments (center-left and
right), even though both governments in the former group faced rather equal
economic challenges, while both governments in the latter group faced more
favorable economic conditions.
In sum, the extensive analysis of policy intentions supports our hypotheses, and
it is thus consistent with the central theoretical argument about the role of tax
policy in systemic retrenchment. But is this a result of deliberate government
strategies? To provide an answer to this question we now turn to the in-depth
analysis of tax policy strategies of the right-wing government that held office from
2001 to 2008 to explore the underlying political considerations and strategic
reasoning about tax policy of this government.
Linking government intention and government strategy
The right-wing government, led and dominated by the Liberal Party, gained office
in 2001 in the aftermath of a campaign shaped by one of the most persistent and
powerful pledges in contemporary Danish politics; namely, the ‘tax stop principle’
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(Regeringen, 2001). The tax stop principle meant that no existing taxes could be
increased, nor could any new tax be invented without corresponding reliefs in
other taxes (Skatteministeriet, 2002: 5). The tax stop was developed as an alter-
native to direct cutbacks in welfare benefits, because, as mentioned by a former
minister, direct policy retrenchment ‘is impossible to pursue if you want a serious
career in Danish politics’ (Interview #1).
Between the late 1980s and late 1990s the Liberal Party had repeatedly called
for significant welfare retrenchments in electoral campaigns and party programs.
But it was a disastrous strategy and especially the electoral defeat in 1998 trig-
gered a major revision of the liberal strategy (Interviews #1, #2, #3, #4, #5).
The final days of the 1998 campaign were dominated by a fierce debate con-
trasting welfare state preservation and significant tax cuts. The incumbent social
democratic prime minister issued a written ‘guarantee’ that he would not retrench
the popular early retirement benefits if re-elected – something that the Liberals
campaigned for at the same time as they pledged to abolish a special house owner
tax (Aylott, 1999). In the wake of the 1998 electoral defeat, the liberal strategists
concluded that the combination of direct welfare retrenchment and excessive tax
cuts had to be abandoned in order to win the next election. The party needed to
convince the electorate that a liberal prime minister would not dismantle the
universal Danish welfare state (Interviews #1, #2, #4, #5). In summary, the party
found it difficult to attract votes on a policy position that suggested concentrated
gains in return for concentrated costs. Hence, in 2001 all proposals of pro-
grammatic retrenchment were abandoned, while ‘the tax stop was adopted as the
crank of the electoral – and later on the government – strategy’ (Interview #2).
The tax stop was efficient in helping the party to avoid discussions about the
redistributive effects of cutting back on the welfare state as well as excessive tax
cuts – a debate which is lost beforehand since losses loom larger than gains
(Vis and van Kersbergen, 2007). The tax stop was a game changer in Danish
politics. Not only did the liberal party win the election in 2001 and gain office, it
did so by conquering the ownership of several welfare state issues from the Social
Democrats (Blomqvist and Green-Pedersen, 2004).
The tax stop had two main functions. First, it was conceived of as a short-term
strategy to win the 2001 election and was explicitly invented to avoid associations
between a right-wing government and radical welfare retrenchment. Second, and
highly relevant for the argument in this article, the tax stop principle was thought of
as an instrument to facilitate systemic retrenchment by putting an efficient limit on
welfare state growth. Several of the interviewees pointed out that limiting the govern-
ment revenue was believed to curb the financial capacity for further public sector
expansion. The tax stop would ‘delimit the revenue and it could in turn play a part in
the control of the [public] expenses – it would be an indirect way to conduct spending
policy’ (Interview #3). Likewise one of the former ministers argued that with ‘a tax
stop there will be a natural limit to how much the public sector can expand [y] a tax
stop could discipline the public economy’ (Interview #1).
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The idea of the tax stop is thoroughly explained in a policy paper published
after the new government was installed in 2001 (Skatteministeriet, 2002: 5–37).
It appears that the tax stop was theoretically based on the assumption that
collecting taxes per se induces an upward pressure on public consumption – an
assumption directly inspired by Brennan and Buchanan’s (1980) theory on taxes,
public budgets, and the public economy. Since public revenue automatically yields
public expenses, a defined limit to governments’ capacity to create revenue could
be seen as an efficient way of limiting public expenses (Skatteministeriet, 2002: 7).
Hence, the tax stop principle became an instrument to control public consump-
tion indirectly and the government was apparently familiar with the logic of
systemic retrenchment via tax policy; where there is no money, there can be no
programs. Local government spending was a particular target. City councils can
not only spend money, they can also collect taxes and both of the former ministers
explained that the tax stop was designed to delimit relatively large annual growth
rates in local public consumption (Interviews #1, #2).
The tax stop clearly had an electoral side to it. Compared with former propo-
sals of programmatic welfare state retrenchment (e.g. the 1998 pledge to retrench the
early retirement benefits), indirect systemic retrenchments entailed a slow reduction
of tax revenue obfuscating the link between deliberate policy decisions on taxation
and their long-term effects on the benefit side of the welfare state (Interviews #1, #3,
#4). Thus, the liberal government’s policy goal to shrink the welfare state did not
change between 1998 and 2001, but it was pursued by different means – first and
foremost by the economic logic of the tax stop (Interview #1).
While the main theoretical argument that systemic retrenchment via tax policy
allows governments – or at least the particular government in question here – to
pursue welfare cutbacks by other means than programmatic retrenchment finds
empirical support, the interviewees did not strongly support the theoretical
assumption of direct tax reliefs as popular policy measures. One of the former
ministers stated that ‘our point of departure has recurrently been that we should
not engage in an election campaign about taxation [y] During the ten years in
office we did adopt tax cuts but I don’t know how much benefit we have had’.
Several other interviewees shared this reservation and it is evident that tax reliefs
should be handled with caution and adopted only in such a way that they are
not easily associated with programmatic retrenchment (Interviews #1, #2, #4).
Judging from the interviews, excessive tax cuts are – contrary to our expectation –
often perceived as measures that impose immediate losses.
Nevertheless, the right-wing government adopted a number of minor tax
reductions (Regeringen, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007b) and two larger tax reforms
throughout its incumbency, and these ‘cutbacks were designed to ensure that a
large group of voters would have something positive to take home’ (Interview #1),
which is consistent with H1.
Moreover, the design of the tax reforms is consistent with H2. In 2004, the
government reached an agreement with its parliamentary support party, the
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Danish People’s Party, to reduce taxation on wages. A special tax credit was
introduced to all wage earners and tax concessions given to income groups in the
median bracket, just as a general personal tax deduction was increased. Part of
these direct tax reliefs were financed by increases in less visible taxes on energy
and duties (Regeringen, 2007a). This line was continued with other reforms in
2007 and 2009 (Regeringen, 2009). Why did the government design the tax
reforms this way – did it respond to globalization and macroeconomic challenges
or was it driven by electoral considerations? Even though the interviewees argue
that the reforms were meant to increase labor market participation ‘there is of
course an electoral perspective [y] if there was only an economic perspective,
every economist would say; abolish the special tax on the highest income’
(Interview #1). The government, in fact, pursued a specific electoral interest as it
was important to the liberal Prime Minister to communicate that ‘the Liberal
Party is the party for the Danish wage earner [y] When you aim to position
the Liberal Party as the large, popular center party it is suitable to appeal to the
‘‘blue social democrats’’’ (Interview #3, see also Interview #5).
Although it is unclear whether a government can expect to win votes by sug-
gesting tax cuts, we find it relatively safe to conclude that the right-wing government
saw the tax stop as a vehicle to achieve systemic retrenchment rather than just an
‘answer’ to macroeconomic challenges and a short supply of labor. This is clear from
the interviews and from the theory of public budgets to which it was explicitly
linked. We acknowledge that tax reforms can be used to stabilize the welfare state in
the long run, and that the stimulation of labor market participation is indeed con-
sistent with right-wing ideology. But we also argue that tax policy reform can be
used strategically by governments in order to achieve systemic retrenchment.
Conclusion and discussion
The present study explores an often neglected aspect in welfare state analysis; the
role of tax policy in welfare retrenchment. We conclude that governments seem to
perceive tax cuts as less electorally risky than direct retrenchment on the benefit
side of the welfare state. We also reveal that partisan politics matter for this type
of policy reform – a finding which is consistent with observations made by other
scholars (Cusack and Beramendi, 2006; Swank, 2006).
The general pattern identified in the analysis of policy intentions is supported by
the in-depth study of the latest right-wing government in Denmark. The government
openly advanced the tax stop principle and advertised a series of genuine tax cuts.
These political attacks on the economic basis of the welfare state are quite different
from the strategy of its center-left predecessor, which invented a series of new, indirect
taxes with the explicit goal of ensuring the future financial basis of the welfare state.
Even more interesting, the qualitative analysis supports the causality of our core
argument; right-wing governments pursue welfare state retrenchment in an
indirect manner by reducing the public revenue. However, the empirical study also
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suggests that the ‘starving the beast’ strategy requires patience because drastic tax
cuts by policymakers are supposed to be almost as unpopular as programmatic
retrenchment in services and benefits. Against this backdrop, we cannot sustain
the idea that cutting taxes rather than rolling back social protection reverses the
political logic of welfare state retrenchment completely. The strategy does not
always work and should be pursued with caution. Governments might pursue
systematic retrenchment via tax relief and thus impose indirect costs, but the other
half of the equation, that is, the tax cuts themselves, are electorally risky because
voters easily connect them to direct cutbacks in welfare programs. Albeit not
included in our research period, this might be one of the reasons for the electoral
defeat of the right-wing government in 2011. During the election campaign the
opposition forcefully argued that the tax stop and the tax reforms undertaken by
the government had weakened the financial base of the Danish welfare state.
At a general level, one should bear in mind that our case is characterized as a
most-likely case that renders the external validity of a positive finding limited.
So how would our central claims apply in other political and welfare state
systems? We do not claim universal applicability of the theory proposed here, but
neither do we see any reason why similar results should not be found in other
coordinated European economies with expanded welfare states that depend
financially on the high taxation of incomes (cf. Cusack and Beramendi, 2006).
Thus, we suggest that our core argument, supported by the empirical findings,
opens a new pathway for welfare state scholars and that an important next step
would be cross-country comparative analyses – especially comparisons with
welfare regimes that financially rely heavily on social security contributions. Even
if taxation of personal income is high in most European countries, contributory
arrangements are well known in Continental Europe. In such systems, money put
into the welfare state is often perceived as a ‘deferred wage’ (Bonoli and Palier,
2001: 63). In this environment governments should be even more careful in
pursuing programmatic retrenchment as this would be seen as a political measure
that reduces wages. Systemic retrenchment via tax relief might, on the other hand,
be more feasible because it is less directly linked to welfare state spending.
Future studies should also take a closer look at the strategies and political
considerations of left-wing governments. We found a right-wing government that
clearly pursued an idea of systemic retrenchment. It would be interesting to explore
if left-wing governments are equally concerned about protecting government
revenue to ‘feed the beast’ and perhaps lock future right-wing governments onto
current levels of social welfare protection. The quantitative part of our analysis
indicates that such a finding should be possible.
On the basis of our theoretical propositions and their empirical support in the
Danish case we are convinced that the future study of welfare state contraction
would benefit from paying more attention to systemic retrenchment in general
and the revenue side of the welfare state in particular. In the era beyond class
politics, the inclination to pursue indirect retrenchment through systemic change
16 M I C H A E L B . K L I T G A A R D , C H R I S T I A N E L M E L U N D - P R Æ S T E K Æ R
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773912000252
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Library, on 17 Jan 2017 at 09:43:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
has probably increased a great deal because the interplay between parties, voters,
the media, and organized interests has become fragmented and because govern-
ments face challenges of welfare state adaptation and often find themselves
trapped between goals of policy and votes.
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Appendix: Coding procedure and rel iabi l i ty tests
After two rounds of intensive training, the quantitative data set was hand coded by
four student assistants on the basis of parliamentary records. The first task was to
identify the relevant laws, and the students reviewed all laws adopted within the
portfolio of the relevant ministers, that is, the ministers for health care, the labor
market, and taxation. Some areas did not have dedicated portfolio ministers during
the entire period. We therefore also reviewed all laws enacted by the ministers of
finance and the interior because they previously had jurisdiction over taxation and
health care, respectively. Whereas we include all laws passed under the dedicated
ministers, we instructed student coders to include only laws relating to the studied
policy areas from the two latter ministers. The next step in the coding process was to
code the laws included on the variables of interest to the present study.
Since governments seldom explicitly state their intention, the coding was done
according to an interpretation of the direction of the policy change. Law no. 32
from 1998 is, for example, interpreted as an intention to retrench the welfare
state, because it shortened the period during which the unemployed could receive
unemployment benefits from 5 to 4 years. Law no. 234 from 2000 granted
terminally ill persons the right to opt out of the public system and choose one of
three Danish private hospices on the government’s bill. Since this law empowers
the private competitor over the public sector, we interpret it as an intention to
retrench. Finally, law no. 198 from 2009 was coded as a retrenchment because it
provided all taxpayers with an annual tax free ‘green check’ amounting to ,170
Euro as compensation for increasing duties on energy.
To ensure inter-coder reliability, the coders adhered to a detailed coding manual
explaining which bills to include and how to code them. When the data set was finally
compiled, we randomly picked 4 years (9.2% of all bills) for recoding (also done by
the student assistants, ensuring that the same coder did not code the same data twice).
We reached a satisfactory level of reliability (using Holsti’s method) – agreement on
which bills to include in or exclude from the data set50.86 (no individual coder
below 0.78), and agreement on whether a bill retrenched or expanded the welfare
state or was non-codable50.80 (no individual coder below 0.77).
Interviews
Interview #1: Former minister, 31 May 2012 Copenhagen.
Interview #2: Former minister, 31 May 2012 Copenhagen.
Interview #3: Civil servant in the Danish Ministry of Taxation, 31 May 2012
Copenhagen.
Interview #4: Former employee in the liberal party, 7 June 2012 Copenhagen.
Interview #5: Former employee in the liberal party, 7 June 2012 Copenhagen.
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